Justice Unfouled: How We Beat Harassment Policy Abuse After Operation Fouled Anchor

Building with pillars

The Coast Guard BCMR Just Said the Quiet Part Out Loud

A recent Coast Guard BCMR decision should make a lot of people pause—especially anyone whose record was hit with a harassment-related adverse entry during the Coast Guard’s post-Operation Fouled Anchor pressure campaign.

We recently represented a retired Coast Guard Captain whose record had been marked with a harassment-related Page 7 near the end of an otherwise exceptional career. We won the case, and the BCMR ordered that entry removed. That alone is a major result. But the most salient part of the decision is what the Board said about the Coast Guard’s underlying rationale.

The Board held that the Coast Guard’s explanation for substantiating “harassment” was “conclusory and circular,” and it found that the explanation “did not meet the requirements of COMDTINST 5350.6, nor the more general standards to which agency decisions are typically held.” Final Decision, BCMR Docket No. 2025-025, at 8–10 (Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Bd. for Corr. of Mil. Recs. Nov. 20, 2025).

Then came the part that should really get attention: the Board stated that, under the Coast Guard’s revised harassment policy, the officer’s conduct “would not be likely to result in a finding of substantiated harassment today.Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added).

That is not a footnote. That is the story.

The Board's Reasoning

The Coast Guard had treated the conduct at issue as substantiated harassment under the older version of COMDTINST 5350.6. The Board rejected the Coast Guard’s reasoning because the Final Action Report did little more than identify the conduct, quote the policy definition, and announce the conclusion. According to the BCMR, that was not enough. Id. at 8–9.

The Board explained that the Coast Guard gave “no explanation” of how the conduct actually “unreasonably interfered” with the other officer’s duties. Id. at 9. It also cited settled administrative-law principles that “conclusory statements will not do,” quoting Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Pistole, 753 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and that agencies must articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Final Decision, supra, at 9.

The Board did not merely decide that the Coast Guard had been a little too harsh. It held that the Coast Guard had not adequately justified the harassment finding in the first place.

Why this decision cannot be separated from Operation Fouled Anchor

This case did not happen in a normal policy environment.

After Operation Fouled Anchor became public, then-Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan initiated the Coast Guard’s Accountability and Transparency Review to assess the Service’s “authorities, policies, processes, practices, resources, and culture” in light of the OFA revelations. The Coast Guard publicly described that review as part of an effort to ensure a workplace “free from harassment, assault, hazing, bullying, hate and retaliation.”

The Coast Guard later announced that the Commandant had directed 33 initial actions flowing from that review and described those actions as part of a broader effort to strengthen the Coast Guard’s culture in response to OFA.

That pressure campaign had a predictable risk: once an institution goes into full public accountability mode, lines begin to blur. Serious misconduct, lesser workplace friction, personality conflict, isolated misjudgment, and thinly supported accusations all start getting pulled toward the same disciplinary gravity well.

That is where this BCMR case becomes especially important.

The UCI problem no one wants to call by name

Many post-Fouled Anchor cases bear the marks of unlawful command influence. In military law, unlawful command influence is “the mortal enemy of military justice.” United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986); see also United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2017). And the doctrine is not limited to situations where someone can prove a commander explicitly dictated the outcome. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has repeatedly recognized that the appearance problem is just as serious because “the appearance of unlawful command influence is as devastating to the military justice system as the actual manipulation of any given trial.” United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 415 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2003)); see also Boyce, 76 M.J. at 249–50.

That framework fits what the Coast Guard was doing in the aftermath of Operation Fouled Anchor. In such an environment, the pressure to produce visible “accountability” outcomes was obvious. And once that kind of top-down pressure takes hold, it becomes much easier for weak or marginal cases to be pushed through under an expansive misconduct label simply because the institution is determined to show it is acting.

In the case at bar, the Coast Guard took a workplace dispute and stretched it into a formal harassment finding under a policy framework it later suspended and rewrote. The BCMR then found that the Service’s explanation was “conclusory and circular” and legally inadequate. That is exactly the kind of outcome you would expect when institutional pressure begins to substitute for disciplined legal analysis. Whether one calls it actual UCI, apparent UCI, or simply a post-Fouled Anchor command climate that contaminated decision-making, the point is the same: the fairness of the process was compromised from the top down.

The policy changed, and the Board noticed

This is the part that should not be buried.

After the events in this case, the Coast Guard itself suspended the prior harassment policy. In January 2025, ALCOAST 028/25 announced that COMDTINST 5350.6 “is suspended pending a comprehensive review,” while directing leaders to resolve pending matters and related misconduct “at the lowest appropriate level.”

Then, in November 2025, the Coast Guard rolled out COMDTINST 5350.6A and explained that the revision followed “a comprehensive review of harassing behavior policy and procedures” and was designed to facilitate “the timely resolution of reports of harassing behavior at the lowest appropriate level.”

The revised instruction materially narrowed the definition of harassment. It now provides that harassment is “[u]nwelcome conduct based on” a protected characteristic and that “[t]he conduct must be severe or pervasive to constitute harassment.” COMDTINST 5350.6A § 3-2. It also defines an “intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment” as conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive such that it creates an objectively hostile work environment,” and defines “unreasonably interferes” in terms of an “articulable, decidedly adverse impact” on work performance.

The BCMR expressly took those changes into account. It stated that under the revised policy, “to constitute harassment, conduct must be severe and pervasive and/or implicate a protected characteristic,” and it concluded that the officer’s conduct “would not be likely to result in a finding of substantiated harassment today.” Final Decision, supra, at 9–10.

That is huge.

It means the Board itself recognized that the Coast Guard’s old framework was broad enough to support findings that the current framework likely would not. Moreover, it signaled that correction boards are willing to take such occurrences into account in their equity analyses, even in cases arising under the old policy.

The Board’s Holistic Approach

Another important part of the decision: the Board did not lose sight of who this officer was.

It noted his “more than 26-year career in the Coast Guard,” his “universally highly positive” OERs, the absence of derogatory material elsewhere in his file, and the fact that he attained the rank of CAPT/O-6. Id. at 9. It also acknowledged his view that his “career and retirement were marred by this incident.” Id. at 10.

That was exactly the right approach. A correction board is not just supposed to ask whether someone can be blamed for something. It is supposed to ask whether the official record, taken as a whole, reflects fair and supportable treatment. Here, especially in light of the policy makeover, the Board concluded that it did not.

What this means for other Coast Guard members and retirees

This decision does not mean every harassment-related adverse entry from the post-OFA period is automatically invalid. The Board was careful not to say that. Id. at 10.

But it does mean something very important: some of those entries may have been built on a policy framework that was too broad, applied under a climate of institutional pressure, and supported by reasoning that would not survive scrutiny if anyone bothered to look closely.

That is especially true in harassment cases involving isolated conduct, interpersonal quibbling, or findings that sound serious only because they arose via “harassment” mechanisms.

If the Coast Guard used the old framework to convert a workplace dispute into a permanent stigma, this decision is a reminder that the result may not be as final as the Service would like.

The Lingering Problem

The Service is not going to reopen every questionable case on its own. It is not going to comb through old Page 7s, OERs, substantiated findings, and Other Than Honorable discharges and voluntarily remove the ones that no longer make sense under the current policy. That means the burden falls where it should not: on the individual member or retiree to identify the injustice, build the case, and force the correction through a BCMR.

That is why competent legal representation matters. If your record was tagged with harassment-related adverse material during the Coast Guard’s overbroad post-Operation Fouled Anchor enforcement climate, you may have a path to relief—but only if you act.

Make no mistake: the Secretary should issue guidance—similar in spirit to the Hagel, Kurta, and Wilkie memoranda—directing correction boards to give meaningful, liberalized consideration to cases arising under the Coast Guard’s prior harassment policy where the adverse material rests on conclusory reasoning, weak evidentiary support, isolated conduct, or a policy framework the Service itself later suspended and narrowed. Without that kind of guidance, correction will happen one case at a time, only for those members who know enough, or can afford enough, to fight for it.

Until that happens, the only realistic path for many former members will be to spell it out for the BCMR. If you believe your Coast Guard record was unfairly damaged by a harassment finding under the old framework, our firm is prepared to evaluate the case and pursue relief. The Coast Guard may not be coming back to fix these records on its own. That means the people harmed by them have to take action themselves.

And in the right case, that action can work.